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Does scientific knowledge have limits? This chapter tries to answer this question 
by first investigating the distinct nature of scientific knowledge, as contrasted 
with other kinds of knowledge. Two plausible proposals are considered: 
scientific knowledge as high-grade knowledge and scientific knowledge as 
objectifying knowledge. The chapter then investigates what these two proposals 
entail for the question of whether scientific knowledge is limited. It turns out 
that, on both proposals, there are in-principle limits to what can be known 
scientifically. This spells trouble for any forms of scientism denying this.
Keywords:   scientific knowledge, limits of science, high-grade knowledge, foundationalism, Ernest 
Sosa, objectifying inquiry, Bas van Fraassen
8.1 Introduction
Knowledge comes in different kinds. Bertrand Russell famously drew a threefold 
distinction between propositional knowledge, knowledge how, and knowledge by 
acquaintance (Russell 1910, 1912). Some philosophers discuss the difference 
between knowledge-that (i.e., propositional knowledge) and knowledge-wh (i.e., 
knowledge what, where, who, when; see Parent 2014 for an overview). 
Additionally, several philosophers think first-personal knowledge is importantly 
different from third-personal knowledge (Zagzebski 2012). Eleonore Stump has 
drawn attention to the unique characteristics of second-personal knowledge 
(Stump 2010; cf. also Pinsent 2012).
In this chapter, I want to use the insight that knowledge comes in kinds to 
explore two thoughts: (1) Scientific knowledge is a special kind of knowledge 
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with distinctive characteristics, which set it apart from what we might call 
“everyday knowledge.” (2) That scientific knowledge is a particular kind of 
knowledge has implications for what we can know scientifically. More 
specifically: It implies that scientific knowledge has limits. I will proceed by 
laying out two plausible construals of the distinctive nature of scientific 
knowledge—different, but not incompatible—and exploring what their respective 
implications are for whether scientific knowledge has limits.1
 (p.191) If the argument of this chapter is correct, it spells trouble for various 
versions of scientism. Some versions of scientism hold that science has no limits, 
or at least none that can be established a priori. James Ladyman (this volume) 
defends such a claim and Rik Peels’s chapter contains references to other 
examples (cf. also various contributors to Boudry and Pigliucci 2018). If the 
nature of scientific knowledge imposes constraints on what can be known 
scientifically, then we have reason to reject such no-limits scientism. 
Epistemological scientism maintains that only the natural sciences provide 
genuine knowledge (Stenmark 2001; Peels this volume). If I am right that 
scientific knowledge is inherently limited in certain ways, this constitutes at 
least part of an argument against epistemological scientism, since it shows that 
there might be truths outside the reach of scientific knowledge. To turn this into 
a robust objection against epistemological scientism, we would need a further 
argument to the effect that some of those truths can be known by other means. 
While my argument will hint at some possibilities, I cannot provide a full positive 
defense of them here.
The plan for the rest of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, I will say 
more about what is behind the distinctions between different kinds of knowledge 
in order to see how we might go about distinguishing scientific knowledge from 
other kinds of knowledge. In section 8.3, I will introduce the first way of thinking 
about the nature of scientific knowledge: scientific knowledge as high-grade 
knowledge. In section 8.4, I explore what limits scientific knowledge has on this 
proposal. Section 8.5 introduces a second way of thinking about scientific 
knowledge: scientific knowledge as objectifying knowledge. Section 8.6 then 
discusses what this proposal means for the limits of scientific knowledge. 
Section 8.7 takes stock and concludes the chapter.
8.2 Kinds of Knowledge
As I observed above, many philosophers hold that there are different kinds of 
knowledge. The short list I gave can easily be extended with further proposals 
for distinguishing between different kinds of knowledge. Several virtue 
epistemologists distinguish between low-grade and high-grade knowledge (cf. 
Baehr 2011; Battaly 2008; Greco 2010; Sosa 2007). On one interpretation of 
contextualism, it entails that knowledge has many different  (p.192) senses, 
varying with the strength of your epistemic position (DeRose 2009; Van 
Woudenberg 2005). In theorizing about justification, many have found it useful 
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to distinguish basic from non-basic knowledge or non-inferential from inferential 
knowledge (this distinction is key for any foundationalist theory about 
justification or knowledge; see, e.g., DePaul 2011). Perhaps there is such a thing 
as tacit knowledge, as opposed to explicit (or explicable) knowledge (Polanyi 
1958). Maybe self-knowledge is interestingly different from knowledge of the 
rest of the world (cf. Cassam 2014; Fernandez 2013; Moran 2001). Recent 
epistemology has seen a number of proposals for making sense of group 
knowledge or social knowledge (Bird 2010a; Brady and Fricker 2016; De Ridder 
2014; Gilbert 1989; Lackey 2014; List and Pettit 2011; Miller 2015; Sirtes, 
Schmid, and Weber 2011; Tuomela 1992). New work at the intersection of 
philosophy of mind and epistemology is exploring the notion of extended 
knowledge, that is, knowledge that is extended beyond the mind into the world 
(Carter et al. 2014; Carter et al. 2018).
I take it that none of these distinctions are set in stone. For instance, Stanley and 
Williamson (2001) have argued that knowledge how is reducible to propositional 
knowledge and Matthew Benton (2017) has recently proposed that knowledge of 
persons is different from both propositional knowledge and knowledge by 
acquaintance. For present purposes, it is enough if this list makes it plausible 
that the word “knowledge” in fact masks a diversity of different kinds and sub- 
kinds of knowledge.
On the basis of what do philosophers distinguish among these different kinds of 
knowledge? It seems to me that there are a number of differences behind the 
distinctions. Without pretending to be exhaustive, I want to survey a few of 
them, in order to draw on them later to elucidate a feasible distinction between 
scientific knowledge and other kinds of knowledge. The point of this survey is 
neither to establish the reality of these kinds conclusively, nor to present the 
distinctions between them in rigorous detail. Obviously, a lot more would be 
needed to do that.2
A. Object: One way to distinguish kinds of knowledge is by looking at the 
objects knowledge takes: differences in the kinds of things that are 
known. Propositional knowledge, of course, takes propositions as its 
object, but knowledge-wh has a number of different objects, at least at 
first  (p.193) sight: persons (knowledge-who), locations (knowledge- 
where), times (knowledge-when), objects (knowledge-which), and 
whether-clauses (knowledge-whether).3 Different sorts of objects also 
seem to be what distinguishes knowledge-that (and knowledge-wh) from 
knowledge-how. The latter has something like skills or ways to do 
something as its objects and these are arguably different from 
propositions and wh-objects. Knowledge by acquaintance in turn differs 
from these other kinds of knowledge because it presumably has real 
things or persons, rather than propositions about these things or persons, 
as its objects. This is not to suggest that any difference in the objects of 
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knowledge gives rise to a different kind of knowledge. Clearly, there is no 
interesting difference in kind between knowledge of stuff in my office and 
outside it.
B. Mode of relating to the object: Differences between kinds of knowledge 
can also have be based in how a subject relates to what is known. Some 
examples can clarify what I have in mind.
i. When you have propositional knowledge, you can be related to 
the proposition known in a purely theoretical way: knowing that p 
need not have any practical import. Knowledge-how, however, is 
practical by definition, in the following sense: You cannot possess 
knowledge-how without having certain skills and being able to 
employ those skills in some suitable range of circumstances.4 You 
typically cannot know how to ride a bicycle if you have never 
ridden one. Nor can you know how to do long divisions if you have 
never been instructed in doing them or practiced doing them.
ii. Some forms of knowledge necessarily involve (the possibility of) 
mental access to what is known. When you know something, you 
can bring the object of your knowledge before your mind’s eye, so 
to speak. Propositional knowledge, knowledge-wh, and knowledge 
by acquaintance are like this. Other kinds of knowledge can 
remain wholly implicit (although they need not necessarily be so). 
You can know how to do something without ever mentally 
representing your skill. Similarly, it is the very definition of tacit 
knowledge that it isn’t explicit; it manifests itself in cognitive and 
practical behavior, but  (p.194) isn’t accessed and represented 
consciously. The relation between yourself and the object of your 
knowledge isn’t mediated by mental awareness.
iii. Another difference is whether your access to what is known is 
mediated by some representational structure. Propositional 
knowledge, at least as traditionally conceived, is conceptually 
structured.5 Relevant facts are captured in the form of 
propositions that relate various concepts to one another and apply 
them to the situation at hand. To know that there is a cat on the 
mat involves some sort of easily accessible internal representation 
that has as its content a cat on the mat. Knowledge by 
acquaintance, in contrast, is not supposed to involve such an 
intermediate vehicle.6 It is a form of direct awareness of an object 
or person, unmediated by descriptions, propositions, concepts, or 
similar representational structures. To know your headache by 
acquaintance, for instance, is not to know that you have a 
headache or to apply some concept to it, but to be (or have been) 
directly aware of it. Something similar goes for knowledge-how. To 
know how to do something does not require having an internal 
representation of your doing it (although it of course it doesn’t 
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exclude it either). This is why it is often claimed that knowledge- 
how can be tacit and need not be explicable in words or imagery.
C. Strength of epistemic position: A further basis for distinguishing kinds 
of knowledge lies in the strength of your epistemic position vis-à-vis the 
object of your knowledge. There are at least two ways to make sense of 
this.
i. The first is in a purely quantitative manner. A straightforward 
way to think of this is in terms of how strong your justification (or 
warrant) is. If it is strong enough, you have knowledge. If it’s even 
higher, you know for sure, or you’re certain. Suppose you see a 
horse  (p.195) approaching about 2000 feet away. If your eyesight 
is perfect and you’re in clear daylight, you’ll be certain that there 
is a horse there. However, when there’s a fog, you can’t be very 
sure, even if you do discern a horse-shaped figure with enough 
clarity to know that there’s a horse approaching. Strength of 
justification varies with how much justification you have from one 
source (eyesight under more or less suitable circumstances) and 
with the number of different sources of justification (perception, 
testimony, memory, reasoning, etc.). On such a purely quantitative 
approach, however, there are no non-arbitrary sharp boundaries 
we can latch onto to distinguish between different kinds of 
knowledge. At best, we could draw up rough categories with 
context-sensitive and vague boundaries.
ii. The second way to think about the strength of epistemic 
positions is in a qualitative way. Suppose you’re an externalist 
about knowledge and think that reliably produced belief without 
defeaters suffices for knowledge. Then, your belief that you see a 
horse in the above example will constitute knowledge. But now 
suppose you also reflect on your belief and form the meta-belief 
that it was formed in appropriate circumstances, through your 
reliable eyesight, on the basis of clear visual appearances. Or 
suppose that you have considered that your friend, who testified to 
you that a horse would be coming, is one of the most honest 
people you know and that she has never lied to you. Arguably, your 
epistemic position—while continuing to constitute knowledge—is 
now better. Suppose next that you happen to be an optometrist 
and know a lot about the physics and neurology of visual 
perception. Presumably, your epistemic position would be even 
better still. The general thought is this: There are different kinds 
of epistemic standing that might constitute your having knowledge 
and these standings give rise to different kinds of knowledge. 
Purely externalist standing might suffice for knowledge, but if you 
also have one or more characteristically internalist standings vis-à- 
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vis a proposition, your knowledge is of a different, possibly 
superior, kind (cf. Sosa 2007: 129, 2009: 193).7 Such internalist 
standings include reflective meta-beliefs about your first-order  (p. 
196) belief: beliefs about what the grounds for your belief are, 
about the reliability of your belief-forming mechanisms, about your 
belief being properly based on your grounds, about how your 
belief coheres with other things you know, or about your 
intellectual motivations in forming the belief. Differences like 
these are behind Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective 
knowledge (Sosa 2007, 2009), Greco’s distinction between 
knowledge and understanding (Greco 2010: 7–10), and behind 
virtue epistemologists’ distinction between low-grade and high- 
grade knowledge (Baehr 2011: 40ff.; Battaly 2008: 652–659; 
Roberts and Wood 2007: 109; Zagzebski 1996: 273–280).
D. Mode of acquisition: A final basis for distinguishing different kinds of 
knowledge involves the way in which knowledge is acquired. Some kinds 
of knowledge can only be acquired in specific ways. A priori knowledge, if 
it exists, is only available through something like rational intuition or 
insight. First-personal knowledge (such as self-knowledge) is only 
available through methods that are exclusively available from the first- 
personal perspective through faculties like introspection and 
proprioception. To the extent that there is first-personal knowledge, it can 
only be acquired through these methods; there is no other route to it. 
Something similar goes for second-personal knowledge. Some 
philosophers have argued that there are truths, particularly about other 
people, we can only come to know by interacting directly with them. No 
amount of third-personal descriptions or propositional knowledge about 
those people can give you such knowledge (and of course it also cannot 
be obtained from the first-personal perspective). Says Eleonore Stump:
Second-person experiences cannot be reduced to first-person or third- 
person experiences without remainder, and so they cannot be captured by 
first-person or third-person accounts either. . . . Knowledge of persons 
accessible in second-person experiences is not reducible to knowledge 
that. (Stump 2010: 78)
The kind of knowledge that is most familiar in epistemology, third-personal 
knowledge, is available through various sorts of familiar methods (perception, 
testimony, reasoning, etc.) that do not depend crucially on the internal 
perspective of particular people or on interactions between people.
 (p.197) This concludes my overview of possible ways to account for different 
kinds of knowledge. I will draw on this list as a toolkit to get clearer about what 
is specific about scientific knowledge, as opposed to everyday knowledge.
Kinds of Knowledge, Limits of Science
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8.3 Scientific Knowledge: First Pass
One might expect to find building blocks for a general characterization of the 
nature of scientific knowledge in the debate about a demarcation criterion 
between science and non-science or in contemporary epistemological reflections 
on scientific knowledge. It turns out, however, that neither of these places have 
much to offer on the topic. Reflecting on the demarcation debate in 1983, Larry 
Laudan concluded that it had come to naught:
It is probably fair to say that there is no demarcation line between science 
and non-science, or between science and pseudo-science, which would win 
assent from a majority of philosophers. Nor is there one which should win 
acceptance from philosophers or anyone else. (Laudan 1983: 112)
This remains the majority opinion and the demarcation question has largely lost 
the interest of philosophers of science.8 Equally remarkably, neither recent 
mainstream epistemology nor philosophy of science say much about the general 
nature of scientific knowledge. The former remains mostly focused on more 
mundane instances of knowledge, while the latter appears to have become wary 
of general claims about science, focusing instead on narrower philosophical 
questions pertaining to the special sciences.9
This doesn’t mean that we’re completely at a loss for ideas about the distinctive 
nature of scientific knowledge. For starters, we can revisit the old philosophical 
ideal of scientific knowledge: scientia or episteme. As used by philosophers such 
as Aristotle and Descartes, this notion of knowledge  (p.198) entailed a 
particularly elevated epistemic status, which still seems like a fitting aim for 
science. In science, we’re not content to “just know,” we want to understand the 
reasons why things are as they are and to grasp how everything hangs together. 
I’ll say more about this in the next section. Next, one of the few contemporary 
philosophers of science whose work does contain suggestions about the nature 
of scientific knowledge is Bas van Fraassen. According to him, it is “objectifying 
knowledge.” It has a special mode of representing its objects, which we don’t 
find in other forms of rational engagement with the world. I’ll elaborate on his 
thoughts in section 8.6. These two proposals set the agenda for the rest of the 
chapter: I’ll develop them in more detail and explore what they imply for the 
limits of scientific knowledge.
8.4 Scientific Knowledge as High-Grade Knowledge
If anything, scientific knowledge is supposed to be high-grade knowledge. This 
has been part and parcel of philosophical reflection on knowledge from the very 
beginning. Plato already contrasted episteme, “genuine” knowledge, with mere 
doxa or opinion. In a similar vein, Descartes distinguished scientia from cognitio. 
In contemporary epistemology, this distinction is typically rendered as the 
contrast between knowledge and mere (true) belief. While there is something to 
be said for this rendering, it is clear that earlier philosophers had a more 
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demanding epistemic state in mind than what many contemporary 
epistemologists—especially those of an externalist bend—call knowledge. For 
Plato and Descartes, as for many others (BonJour 1985; Fumerton 1995), merely 
having a reliably produced true belief or a belief that is true because of an 
exercise of one’s intellectual virtues (understood as reliable faculties) wouldn’t 
have sufficed for “genuine” knowledge. Arguably, then, a more fitting 
contemporary rendering of episteme and scientia would be high-grade 
knowledge, scientific knowledge, or understanding rather than simply 
knowledge.10 But regardless of these historical-interpretive questions, there is a 
distinction between low-grade and high-grade knowledge and it makes sense to 
think of scientific knowledge as high-grade.
What I said above in section 8.3 (under C) about strength of epistemic position 
provides two options to think about high-grade knowledge. First, we can 
construe it as differing quantitatively from low-grade knowledge. High-grade 
knowledge is knowledge that has a lot of positive epistemic status. This certainly 
clarifies part of what is epistemically good about scientific knowledge.  (p.199) 
Scientists observe phenomena very carefully and systematically; use the best 
available observation techniques; repeat their observations where they can with 
independent methods; and engage in a lot of double-checking, both of their own 
observations and inferences as well as those of their peers. As a result, at least 
the low-level observational claims on which scientific models and theories are 
built typically have a great deal of justification. The results of science, of course, 
form a complex edifice of claims, models, and techniques with different levels of 
justification. Even if low-level observational claims are typically highly justified, 
we cannot assume that such high-grade justification transfers losslessly all the 
way up to higher-level theoretical claims, since the latter can be quite loosely 
connected to the former via more or less risky interpretational and ampliative 
inferential steps. But in so far as high-level claims are based on lower-level ones 
through valid interpretations and inferences, and have withstood independent 
critical scrutiny, they, too, can be highly justified.
Do such quantitative differences amount to a difference in kind between 
scientific knowledge and more mundane types of knowledge? Does low-grade 
knowledge transform into a different kind of knowledge once the amount of 
justification or warrant reaches a certain level? As I said above, that seems 
implausible. It is unclear and arbitrary both where the threshold between low- 
grade and high-grade knowledge should be and why a continuum of levels of 
justification would divide into just two kinds of knowledge, rather than three, 
four, or an infinity. There may be significant quantitative differences between the 
amount of justification for ordinary everyday knowledge claims and low-level 
scientific knowledge claims, but this doesn’t constitute a difference in kind.
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The second—and more plausible—way of thinking about high-grade knowledge 
construes it as qualitatively different from low-grade knowledge. We can take a 
cue from Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology (Sosa 2007, 2009, 2011). He 
distinguishes between animal and reflective knowledge. Animal knowledge is 
true belief that is creditable to an agent’s exercise of intellectual virtue. As Sosa 
thinks of it, an intellectual virtue is a reliable belief-forming faculty. A subject 
thus has animal knowledge when her belief is true because of the reliability of 
the faculty used in forming it. It is important to note that animal knowledge does 
not require the agent to have any kind of access to, or beliefs about, the 
reliability of her cognitive faculties, or the fact that her belief is true because of 
the exercise of reliable faculties. It is an entirely externalistic account of 
knowledge.11
 (p.200) Reflective knowledge demands more. It requires “that the knower have 
an epistemic perspective on his belief, a perspective from which he endorses the 
source of that belief, from which he can see that source as reliably truth 
conducive” (Sosa 2009: 135). Hence, to know reflectively, you not only need 
animal knowledge but also a “perspective” on it, that is, a true meta-belief to the 
effect that your first-order true belief was indeed formed through reliable 
faculties. Moreover, this meta-belief, too, should be formed by a reliable 
cognitive faculty and it should be true because it was formed this way. For you to 
have reflective knowledge that there is a cat on the mat, you should not only 
form a true belief through your use of reliable vision, but also reliably form a 
further true belief that your vision is indeed reliable (in the current 
circumstances) and that this accounts for why you have a true belief about the 
cat on the mat. Reflective knowledge thus requires internalist epistemic 
standing: access to some of the factors that account for the strength of one’s 
epistemic position.
Abstracting away from the particulars of Sosa’s position, we can think of high- 
grade knowledge more generally as knowledge that requires internalist 
standing. There are several options for such standing (cf. Alston 2005 for an 
overview): access to (a) the grounds for your belief, (b) the quality of the grounds 
for your belief (or the reliability of the cognitive process by which your belief has 
been produced), (c) the fact that your belief has been properly based on good 
grounds (or non-deviantly produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism), (d) 
the coherence of your belief with your further beliefs. These standings can also 
be combined. The most high-grade (and demanding) type of knowledge would 
involve all of (a) through (d). In order to have high-grade knowledge, you not 
only need to find yourself with a reliably (or virtuously) formed true belief, you 
also need to know something about how or why you find yourself in this 
epistemic position. On this proposal, the qualitative difference between low- 
grade and high-grade knowledge is that the latter requires not just more of the 
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same status that low-grade knowledge also has, but another sort of epistemic 
standing added to it, namely internalist awareness.
This construal of high-grade knowledge fits well with scientific knowledge. What 
matters in science is not just reliable (virtuous) observation and reasoning (i.e., 
animal knowledge), but also insight into why your observations and inferences 
are reliable (i.e., reflective knowledge).12 This is why scientists  (p.201) care so 
much about methodology, research design, proper experimental setup and 
execution, and correct use of statistics and other inferential methods. Scientific 
knowledge thus requires internalist epistemic standing: access to the grounds 
for one’s conclusions and to the epistemic goodness of those grounds.13
8.5 The Limits of High-Grade Knowledge
Let’s now consider what follows from the above proposals for the limits of 
scientific knowledge, thought of as high-grade knowledge.
Since the first proposal—high-grade knowledge as quantitatively highly justified 
knowledge—seemed unpromising, I’ll be relatively brief about it. Are there limits 
to how much justification we can acquire for certain propositions? Presumably 
there are, and they have to do mostly with contextual factors, such as what is 
known, what methods are available, technological developments, and our 
spatiotemporal position in the universe. To illustrate, consider Galileo. Given 
what was known and what could be observed and measured in his time with a 
reasonable degree of precision, it was very difficult, if not outright impossible, 
for him to acquire a lot of justification for heliocentrism. Even though later 
research confirmed that he was right, it is probably false that, at the time, 
Galileo really knew that heliocentrism was true and certainly false that he knew 
it with a high degree of justification. And so it goes: As our knowledge, methods, 
and technology develop and become more reliable, we can acquire more 
justification for extant beliefs and acquire new highly justified beliefs.
There are no in-principle limits to scientific knowledge in sight here, with two 
important but uncontroversial exceptions. First, given the laws of nature and our 
position in space-time, parts of the universe must remain unobservable to us, as 
they are located outside our light cone. It is physically impossible for information 
from these parts of the universe to reach us (barring sci-fi scenarios). We might 
still be able to know various things about these parts of the universe by inferring 
them from our knowledge about the observable part of the universe, but 
verifying this knowledge through direct observation and measurement is 
impossible. Hence, there is at least a limit on the kinds of justification we can 
possess here. Whether this translates into a limit on the  (p.202) amount of 
justification we can have is an open question, the answer to which depends on 
how reliable our inferential methods are.
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Second, our natural human cognitive equipment might pose limits to what we 
can know with high degrees of justification.14 Given the sorts of brains and 
perceptual capacities that we have, there must be limits to what we can grasp 
and know. Of course, our perceptual capacities have been greatly enhanced and 
extended by all manner of equipment and this process will no doubt continue. 
But even so, everything we learn must come to us in sensory modalities that we 
can take in. Our brains, too, might pose limits to what we can know. In the 
philosophy of mind, so-called mysterians have argued that we will never be able 
to know the full explanation of consciousness because that is impossible given 
the abilities of brains like ours (McGinn 1991). Perhaps a similar case could be 
made for other highly complex phenomena. Less radically, and in line with the 
present discussion, perhaps there are propositions for which we cannot acquire 
a very high degree of justification because their complexity outstrips our 
cognitive abilities. If that is indeed the case, it would follow that we cannot know 
such propositions scientifically.
Let’s consider the second way of thinking about high-grade knowledge: scientific 
knowledge as knowledge with internalist epistemic standing. As noted above, 
there are various sorts of internalist standing.
We can get a handle on one class of beliefs for which it is impossible to acquire 
internalist standing of kind (a)—access to the grounds for your belief—by 
revisiting popular foundationalist views about epistemic justification. 
Foundationalists distinguish between basic and non-basic beliefs (DePaul 2011; 
Huemer 2010). The latter are beliefs that we accept on an inferential basis, on 
the basis of other beliefs; and the former are accepted in a direct way, not on the 
basis of other beliefs. Ultimately, the foundational structure of all our non-basic 
beliefs must bottom out in basic beliefs. If things go well epistemically, in the 
sense that our beliefs are justified, this foundational structure also lends 
justification to our beliefs. At the bottom, justified basic beliefs are justified, not 
because of their inferential connections with other beliefs, but in virtue of some 
other epistemically good-making feature (e.g., their indubitability; self-evidence; 
or their being produced by well-functioning, basic belief-forming mechanisms). 
Justified non-basic beliefs, in turn, get  (p.203) their epistemic status from other 
(justified) non-basic beliefs and ultimately from justified basic beliefs.
From this, we can see that justified basic beliefs, by definition, lack one type of 
ground: other (justified) beliefs. But some of them will have other grounds that 
are accessible upon reflection. Consider a lowly perceptual belief: I see that 
there is a tree in my garden. Assume this belief of mine is justified (there was 
nothing wrong with my eyes, conditions for tree-perception were suitably 
normal). Presumably, the ground for this belief is something like my perceptual 
experience, my being appeared to tree-ly, or it seeming to me that I see a tree. 
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For such beliefs, internalist standing (a)—access to the grounds for belief—is 
possible.
But some basic beliefs appear to be groundless. What would constitute the 
grounds for beliefs that basic logical, mathematical, or conceptual truths hold, 
or for simple memory beliefs? Such beliefs simply strike us as true, but they 
aren’t based on perceptual or other experiences. At best, they are accompanied 
by non-experiential seemings, but such seemings are not their grounds. The 
relation between them and the relevant beliefs is quite different from the 
paradigmatic grounds-for-belief relation as it holds between experiential beliefs 
and the experiences on which they are based, or between inferential beliefs and 
the beliefs on which they are based. For one thing, the seemings that accompany 
these beliefs are much less specific and conceptually structured than the typical 
grounds for beliefs. Seeing a tree is an experience with rich content, which can 
only serve as the ground for fairly specific beliefs about that tree. The seeming 
that accompanies belief that modus ponens is valid is just a general sense that it 
must be so, which is hardly distinguishable from the seeming that accompanies, 
say, belief that 2 + 2 equals 4. We don’t have different seemings for various 
basic conceptual, logical, and mathematical truths, whereas our experiences for 
different experiential beliefs are clearly different (no one would confuse seeing a 
tree with hearing a train approaching). Similarly for memory beliefs: When I 
remember that I lived in Rotterdam in 1999 this is just how it seems to me. A 
different memory would elicit roughly the same seeming (although there might 
be differences in how compelling and strong the seemings feel, but it’s not as if 
each memory belief has its own unique seeming). While this is not a rigorous 
argument that there are groundless basic beliefs, it at least suggests that some 
categories of basic beliefs lack grounds.
If this is right and there are indeed groundless but nonetheless epistemically 
upstanding beliefs, then they constitute a limit for scientific knowledge. Perhaps 
they can be known (that will depend on your exact theory of  (p.204) 
knowledge), but they cannot be known scientifically, since it is impossible for 
these beliefs to have the required internalist standing.
Internalist standing of type (b) requires access to the epistemic goodness of the 
grounds for your belief (or of your belief-forming process). This gives rise to an 
in-principle limit for scientific knowledge. To know—or believe with justification 
—that your grounds are truth-conducive or your belief-forming processes 
reliable, requires you to form an epistemically justified perspective on the 
reliability of one or more of your belief-forming practices. There are reasons to 
doubt that this can be done. As Alston (1993) has argued, arguments for the 
reliability of our basic belief-forming practices are inevitably epistemically 
circular: Epistemically justified belief in their premises presupposes the truth of 
their conclusion. When you want to argue for the reliability of sense perception, 
you inevitably rely on claims that are only justified if sense perception is in fact 
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reliable. For instance, to know that my perceiving a tree is an epistemically good 
ground for my belief that there is a tree, I rely on the claim that my visual 
perception is reliable (in suitable circumstances). If I were to try to justify that 
claim, I will end up appealing to past cases of visual perception that turned out 
to be successful. But to know that these past cases were successful, I must rely 
on either my own visual perception, that of others, or perhaps on other modes of 
sensory experience. As Alston argues at length, there is no escaping this circle: 
To believe the premises of arguments for the reliability of sense perception, you 
must presuppose their conclusion. And the same goes for other basic practices 
of belief formation: memory, induction, testimony, rational intuition, etc.
Opinions differ about what general lessons we should draw from this. Whether 
epistemic circularity really prevents us from knowing that our basic belief- 
forming practices are reliable, depends on further views about the nature of 
knowledge and justification.15 This doesn’t matter for my purposes. The 
conclusion I’m drawing is that there is at least a kind of limit to our access to the 
quality of our grounds for belief—and thus another limit to what we can know 
scientifically. Epistemic circularity precludes one thing that seems particularly 
relevant for high-grade knowledge: to wit the possibility of giving an 
unproblematic (i.e., non-circular) argument for the conclusion that the grounds 
for some of your beliefs are epistemically good. Since epistemic circularity 
affects all of our basic belief-forming practices,  (p.205) this will be true for the 
grounds of our perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, testimonial beliefs, inductive 
beliefs, etc. That is, pretty much all of our beliefs.16
Thinking about internalist standing of type (b)—access the quality of the grounds 
for our beliefs—yields a further limit for scientific beliefs in particular. This one 
is not an in-principle limit, but an empirically based and developing one. Start 
with the platitude that science, like all of our cognitive endeavors, is fallible. We 
should not think that the mere possibility of error throws the quality of our 
grounds for belief into doubt. That’s a quick route to radical skepticism. We can 
be more specific about how fallibility creates problems for scientific knowledge. 
First of all, Laudan’s (1981) famous pessimistic meta-induction suggests that we 
should not be too confident about the epistemic status of our current best 
scientific theories. The history of science shows a steady and sure turnover of 
theories (explanations, models): Older theories are rejected as mistaken in favor 
of newer and superior ones. Most past scientific theories have turned out to be 
false. A simple inductive argument should lead us to conclude that, most likely, 
our current scientific theories will one day be rejected as false.
Granted, the pessimistic meta-induction is not uncontested. Several philosophers 
have argued that, once we restrict the inductive basis to developed, mature 
scientific theories or to the core tenets of scientific theories, the turnover rate 
becomes much less impressive. Instead, we witness significant amounts of 
continuity and accumulation in the development of science.17 Such observations, 
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however, work with the benefit of hindsight. In retrospect, we can see which 
elements and aspects of scientific theories are preserved in successor theories, 
but scientists who were working on those earlier  (p.206) theories would have 
had at best a partial and uncertain view of which parts of their theories would 
stand the test of time. The same will be true of current scientists. While these 
qualifications give us reason to be more confident about the quality of the 
grounds for long-established central scientific claims and theories, once we 
approach the frontiers of science, judgments about the epistemic quality of the 
grounds for belief ought to become less and less certain.18
This conclusion is reinforced by recent work in scientometrics. John Ioannidis 
(2005) has shown that it is highly likely that most published findings are simply 
false! He draws this conclusion from a simple but realistic probabilistic 
simulation model that takes into account several parameters of possible 
research designs and the current socio-economic organization of scientific fields. 
His startling conclusion is borne out by empirical scientometric investigations. 
Samuel Arbesman (2012: Ch. 3) reports that collections of what he— 
misleadingly—calls scientific facts have a “half-life.” For any given body of 
published scientific literature (journal articles, books), there is a more or less 
predictable time period within which half of it will have been overturned. For 
instance, after 45 years, biomedical experts reject half of the published findings 
on cirrhosis and hepatitis as false or superseded (ibid.: 28–29). In another study, 
researchers found that after about 10 years, half of the papers in the prominent 
Physical Review journals were never again cited.19 While this doesn’t quite show 
that these papers are flat-out rejected, it does indicate that they are no longer 
considered relevant. Surely, for some cases, this will be because they are 
considered false. The exact numbers for half-lives vary among fields and 
publication types, but the general picture is clear: For any novel published 
scientific claim, there is a good (i.e., higher than 50 percent on average) chance 
that it will be discarded sooner or later.
Compare this with a situation in which you assess your own reasoning powers. 
When you argue, you try to be as careful as you can, and you thus have a pretty 
high initial confidence the conclusions you reach. You’re aware of the grounds 
for your conclusions and you think they are pretty solid. But  (p.207) then a 
trustworthy expert tells you that you only make sound inferences, say, 50 
percent of the time. (Or, if you will, you discover this yourself by revisiting 
conclusions you drew from your past reasoning.) Surely, this undermines your 
having high-grade knowledge of the conclusions of your reasoning. Perhaps you 
can maintain some high-grade knowledge by comparing your reasoning with 
that of others and by finding out what sort of conclusions you have arrived at 
time and again through multiple independent strands of reasoning. But even so, 
you should definitely grant that the amount of high-grade knowledge you have is 
significantly less than you initially thought.
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The above empirical facts thus support the claim that there is a limit to what we 
can know scientifically. Relatively novel scientific claims cannot be known with 
robust internalist standing, because we do not have reliable access to the quality 
of the grounds on which they are based. These grounds may look epistemically 
superb to us at the time, but sober facts about the development of science 
demonstrate that there is a big chance that they are really not. At best, we may 
possess genuine scientific (high-grade) knowledge of mature theories and 
claims.
The upshot of this section is that construing scientific knowledge as high-grade 
knowledge gives us four in-principle limits and one developing practical limit to 
what we can know scientifically: (1) facts and events beyond our light cone, (2) 
things that are beyond our cognitive capacities, (3) groundless basic 
propositions, (4) the reliability of our basic belief-forming processes, and (5) the 
great majority of recent published claims.
8.6 Scientific Knowledge as Objectifying Knowledge
I’ll now consider the second proposal for thinking about the distinctive nature of 
scientific knowledge. This proposal focuses on the object of scientific knowledge 
or, more precisely, on the specific mode by which scientific knowledge 
represents or construes its object. It thus takes its inspiration from item B on the 
list in section 8.2. My primary source here will be the philosopher of science Bas 
van Fraassen, but the idea that there is something unique about the way in 
which science engages its objects of knowledge is not unique to him. Different 
versions of it can be found in Neo-Kantianism (e.g., Rickert 1926) and in the 
work of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (1997 [1953]).
To warm up to the idea that there is something distinctive about the way in 
which scientific knowledge represents its objects, I want to revisit the distinction 
between observing something and observing that something is the case (p.208) 
(cf. Van Fraassen 1980: 15).20 You see something fly by your window and notice 
that it’s a sparrow. Of course, you might have failed to notice that it was a 
sparrow, or even that it was a bird. But you would nonetheless have seen the 
sparrow flying by your window—except you wouldn’t have recognized it as such. 
That is, you wouldn’t have observed that a sparrow flew by your window. A 
natural way to understand the difference is that, in the former case, you have 
represented the object of your experience in a specific way or conceptually 
interpreted it, whereas, in the latter, you just have your “raw” experience 
without (much) conceptual interpretation and representation.21 This illustrates 
the thought that a cognitive relation—in this case, seeing—can take its object in 
different ways. The object stays the same, but our way of engaging it, 
representing it, or cognizing about it is different.
Something similar occurs in science, according to Van Fraassen. Scientific 
inquiry, he contends, is objectifying inquiry (Van Fraassen 2002: 156ff). Science 
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doesn’t just observe the world willy-nilly, it objectifies the world and the things in 
it. Van Fraassen never gives a crisp and clear definition of what objectification 
amounts to, but he does discuss five defining features (ibid.: 160–164). In 
general terms, the goal of objectifying inquiry is to take ourselves out of the 
picture: our contingent location in space and time; the contingencies of the 
senses we happen to have; and our subjective limitations, biases, 
preconceptions, etc. By doing so, science aims to study the world as it is 
independently of us and our observations and thinking.22
The first thing that is required for scientific inquiry—as opposed to other forms 
of cognitive engagement—is that a domain of study is delimited. Scientists 
specify in advance what sort of things they will study. This doesn’t mean that 
they say that physics is about physical stuff and biology about living beings; the 
idea is that scientists specify which specific properties and relations they will 
study by stipulating the quantities and parameters that are allowed to figure in 
their descriptions of the phenomena. It’s not that every scientist does this on her 
own every time she begins a new project. In everyday science, the quantities and 
parameters are given by the context of broader lines of inquiry, (sub)disciplines, 
and scientific fields.
 (p.209) Second, not just any specification of parameters will do. Parameters 
must be independent of the scientists carrying out the research. Specifications in 
terms of how things look or feel to us will not do. This constraint was also what 
inspired the old distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
Parameters must capture how the phenomena are in themselves and not how 
they appear to us.23 Independence is often interpreted as requiring quantitative 
measurement. Although quantification can indeed be a good way of making sure 
that parameters do not depend on us, it does not by itself guarantee the right 
sort of independence. We could quantify an object’s size as a multiple or fraction 
of our own length with perfect precision, but such a parameter would still 
improperly depend on us. Similarly, if we could devise reliable ways to quantify 
our subjective taste, that wouldn’t suddenly make it an appropriate parameter 
in, say, chemistry. If we think of ourselves as a measuring apparatus, the thought 
behind independence is that acceptable scientific parameters cannot depend on 
the contingencies of the sort of apparatus that we happen to be.
Third, the set of properly independent parameters and quantities must be 
restricted to those that are relevant: Scientific questions and answers must be 
expressible in terms of the relevant parameters. Unfortunately, Van Fraassen 
doesn’t tell us in general terms what makes parameters relevant or irrelevant, 
but he does mention Galileo’s list of primary qualities for physics (shape, 
position, motion, contact, and number) as an example. The point of this feature 
of objectifying inquiry is to avoid introducing empty terminology: meaningless or 
uninformative notions that lack genuine empirical content. Using a substance’s 
“dormative virtues” to explain why people get sleepy when they use it 
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exemplifies such empty verbiage. Even if we had a way of measuring such 
virtues, they would be unsuitable as a parameter in good science as they don’t 
latch onto a relevant or informative quantity. What counts as relevant can 
develop over time. Before Newton, a parameter like force, describing mysterious 
action at a distance, would not have been acceptable, but it is a central element 
of Newtonian mechanics.
We can think of the previous three features as creating a language for scientific 
inquiry.24 The fourth feature involves experimentation and observation: “nature 
put to the question” (ibid.: 163, my italics). Scientists observe  (p.210) the 
phenomena carefully, often under meticulously prepared (experimental) 
conditions, and record their observations in the previously accepted language of 
science, that is, in terms of the relevant parameters and quantities. The result is 
a systematic set of data, or a “data model,” which can subsequently be studied 
to find patterns.
The fifth feature characterizes scientific theorizing. Hypotheses, models, and 
theories are introduced to account for the data. They, too, must respect the 
language of science and must therefore be formulated in terms of the relevant 
parameters and quantities. But sometimes it will be necessary to introduce novel 
quantities at the level of theory construction. What quantities are permissible? 
Van Fraassen says that it is impossible to give a general and informative answer 
to this, but it depends on the preceding theoretical development of a scientific 
(sub)discipline, on the relation of the proposed novel quantities to older models 
and theories, and, for the special sciences, on the parameters and quantities 
already in use in more fundamental sciences. Theoretical quantities can only be 
observed indirectly, by observing the quantities with which they are connected 
in the model or theory. The quality of hypotheses, models, and theories is 
ultimately decided by how well they fit the data.25
Now we can see more clearly what it might mean to say that scientific 
knowledge involves a special mode of representing of its object. Objectifying 
inquiry requires the deliberate construction of a system of representing the 
world—a scientific language of sorts—consisting of measurable parameters and 
quantities that are properly independent of us and that delimit the possible 
domain of inquiry. This language constrains what can be expressed and 
observed, and what can make it into scientific theories, because every 
observation must be put in terms of the relevant parameters and quantities, with 
possible additions of theoretical quantities.
Let me guard against two potential misunderstandings. First, to draw attention 
to the objectifying character of scientific knowledge is not in any way to suggest 
that science distorts reality. On the contrary, the fit between a scientific account 
of a phenomenon and that phenomenon itself might be excellent. But even in 
cases of optimal alignment, science homes in on its objects in a specific way, by 
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conceiving of them in pre-specified  (p.211) relevant terms that we ourselves 
have authored. The actual phenomena always outstrip their scientific 
descriptions, in the sense that they have more properties—perhaps even 
radically different properties—than any particular scientific description 
captures.
Second, none of this should be read as implying that scientific knowledge is a 
social construction, or that the acceptability of hypotheses and theories is 
largely determined by social processes. According to Van Fraassen, the ultimate 
arbiter for the success of scientific theories—and thus for the parameters and 
quantities in which they are formulated—is their fit with the data. While he 
recognizes that observation is theory-laden and that the interplay between 
theory and observation is often subtle and complex, he remains firmly committed 
to empiricism. In the long run, empirical observations determine what goes in 
science.
8.7 The Limits of Objectifying Knowledge
Let’s now consider whether this conception of scientific knowledge poses limits 
on what we can know scientifically.
The first three features of objectifying inquiry discussed above impose one limit 
on science. Something that cannot be described in the language of science—that 
is, in terms of items on the list of relevant parameters and quantities that define 
the domain of inquiry and that are allowed to figure in the descriptions of 
measurements and in theories—cannot figure in science. This is not to say that 
the sciences all have their own sets of parameters and quantities that are fixed 
once and for all, so that some phenomena can never become objects of scientific 
study. This would make radical innovation and novelty—genuine scientific 
development and progress—impossible. Without the introduction of new 
vocabulary to describe, say, electromagnetic forces, physics would have 
remained stuck in the first half of the 19th century. So limits imposed by the set 
of accepted parameters and quantities are relative to time and the state of 
scientific development. They can be overcome when inexplicable phenomena, 
puzzling experiments, or theoretical difficulties force scientists to introduce 
novel parameters or to develop new theories. Giving specific examples of this 
requires in-depth knowledge of cutting-edge scientific developments, but 
perhaps the well-known incompatibility of general relativity and quantum 
mechanics in physics can serve as a toy illustration. Both theories are extremely 
well established, but also known to be mutually incompatible. Hence, they 
cannot both be correct as they stand. Recasting this in terms of Van Fraassen’s 
notions, we might say that the currently accepted  (p.212) language of physics 
precludes us from finding a solution to the recognized inconsistency. To unify 
both theories, novel parameters and quantities might be needed.26 At any given 
time, the currently accepted language of science puts limits to what science can 
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study. This isn’t a limit that is fixed once and for all, as science may progress by 
revising and extending its vocabulary, but it is a limit nonetheless.
Another limit of scientific knowledge derives from the fact that parameters used 
in science must be independent of observers. This requirement excludes the use 
of parameters that depend on how things seem to us or on what it is like for us to 
experience something. In other words, it precludes what are often called 
phenomenal qualities from playing any role in scientific knowledge. This is 
reasonable enough for most parts of the study of the natural world,27 but 
significantly less so for scientific and humanistic disciplines that involve 
individual and collective human experience in its many varieties: psychology; 
anthropology; sociology; economics; the full range of the humanities; and many 
interdisciplinary fields like communication science, business administration, 
political science, etc. Of course, not every inquiry in these disciplines must 
involve parameters tied to the subjective characteristics of human experience, 
but many of them in fact do. That is because people’s subjective takes on the 
world will often be an important factor in explanations of behavior. This holds for 
the study of history, for studying works of art or other cultural achievements, 
and for many other social-scientific and humanistic inquiries. It would thus seem 
that Van Fraassen’s conception of science poses severe limitations on what can 
be known scientifically. So much so, in fact, that Van Fraassen’s suggestion that 
the objectifying style of inquiry is characteristic for all intellectual pursuits 
carried out with academic rigor loses much of its plausibility.
Perhaps, however, these observations bring out an ambiguity in Van Fraassen’s 
characterization of the independence requirement. It might be interpreted (a) as 
banning parameters and quantities that are essentially tied to the subjective 
character of human experiences from science altogether; or (b) as banning only 
those parameters and quantities that are essentially tied  (p.213) to the 
subjective character of human experience that are not intersubjectively 
accessible or verifiable, that is, that are not independent of the particularities of 
the individuals conducting the inquiry. The worries I raised in the previous 
paragraph primarily affect the first interpretation. On this interpretation, much 
of what goes in psychology, the social sciences, and the humanities would fall 
short of proper objectifying inquiry. This is probably not what Van Fraassen had 
in mind.
On the second interpretation, there is no problem with using subjective human 
experience in scientific inquiry as such, but it must be made to satisfy the 
demands of objectifying inquiry. Experiences must be codified in terms of 
parameters and qualities that are independent of any particular inquirers. And 
this is precisely what the methods of the human sciences and the humanities are 
for. Variables involving subjective experiences are operationalized so that they 
can be measured on a suitably independent scale, for instance, by means of 
surveys. Qualitative information obtained in interviews has to be coded in terms 
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of intersubjectively verifiable variables. Historians have to account for their 
interpretations of the sources in such a way that others can follow and evaluate 
their reasoning. And so on. Since Van Fraassen intended his notion of 
objectifying inquiry to capture every sort of investigation pursued with academic 
discipline, adopting this second interpretation is the charitable thing to do. The 
central question about the limits of scientific knowledge thus transforms into the 
question whether there are limits to what can be captured about subjective 
experience in intersubjective terms.
There is good reason to answer affirmatively. First, there is a large intuitive 
difference between experiencing, say, disgust from the first-personal perspective 
and filling out a survey about what sort of things you find disgusting or scoring 
the intensity of your disgust on a five-point scale. Similarly, how satisfied you are 
at your job, when experienced from within your own subjective point of view is 
very different from the list of answers you might give in a work satisfaction 
survey or in a face-to-face interview, even if you’re completely forthcoming. The 
same holds, a fortiori, for more complex experiences such as appreciating 
Edward Hopper’s Nighthawks, being engrossed in Marilynne Robinson’s Lila, 
playing volleyball, or maintaining a romantic relationship with your significant 
other. These and many other subjective experiences are so richly textured, 
multifaceted, and holistic that they resist description by standardized quantities. 
This is not to deny that parts and aspects of such experiences can be described 
by means of intersubjectively accessible variables, but much in them eludes such 
description. To the extent that first-personal perspectives can be conveyed to 
others, novels and other  (p.214) works of art are arguably more suitable to the 
task. This is precisely because they don’t adhere to the rules of objectifying 
inquiry.
In addition to these intuitive considerations, further support comes from well- 
known arguments for the inherent subjectivity of conscious mental states (Nagel 
1974, 1986) and the irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers 
1996). If Nagel and Chalmers are right that consciousness cannot be accounted 
for in purely physical terms, then its contents are not fully explicable through 
objectifying inquiry either. This is because phenomenal consciousness and the 
subjective, first-personal point of view are essentially tied to experiencing “what 
things are like” for me as an individual. Phenomenal consciousness is defined in 
terms of how things look and feel from the perspective of particular individuals. 
Hence, attempts to describe it will violate Van Fraassen’s independence 
requirement by definition, since that requirement explicitly excludes the use of 
variables and quantities that are tied to a subjective point of view. Some aspects 
of phenomenal consciousness might be shared by many individuals so that they 
are susceptible to intersubjective access, but not everything is. What it is like for 
me to experience things has an essentially private quality. This, then, constitutes 
another in-principle limit for scientific knowledge.28
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This section has shown that, when scientific knowledge is construed as 
objectifying knowledge, we find two more limits to what can be known 
scientifically. (6) One constituted by what Van Fraassen calls the “relevant 
parameters and quantities” for a field of scientific inquiry. Whatever cannot be 
described in terms of them, cannot be studied scientifically (or at least not until 
science has progressed to revise its vocabulary). (7) Subjective, first-personal 
experiences: “what it is like” to experience various kinds of things.
8.8 Conclusion
Thinking about the nature of scientific knowledge throws cold water on 
scientistic assertions to the effect that scientific knowledge knows no limits. I 
hope to have shown that there are at least seven different kinds of limits to 
scientific knowledge. We cannot obtain scientific knowledge of: (1) facts  (p.215) 
and events beyond our light cone; (2) things that are beyond our cognitive 
capacities; (3) groundless basic propositions; (4) the reliability of our basic 
belief-forming processes; (5) the great majority of recently published scientific 
claims; (6) things that cannot be described in terms of currently accepted 
“relevant parameters and qualities” for various fields of inquiry; (7) subjective, 
first-personal experiences: “what it is like” to experience various kinds of things.
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, establishing that scientific knowledge 
has limits, isn’t a full-fledged objection to epistemological scientism, for it might 
be that the limits of scientific knowledge simply coincide with those of 
knowledge in general: What cannot be known scientifically cannot be known at 
all. Defending the claim that there is knowledge to be had outside science falls 
beyond the scope of this chapter, although I do think that for at least a few of the 
items on the above list, for instance 3, 4, 6, and 7, it is at least intuitively 
plausible that we can know them by other means than scientific inquiry.
I want to close with two final remarks to put the project of this chapter in 
perspective. First, the above list of limits isn’t radically novel or different than 
what other authors have proposed (e.g., Rescher 1999). While this may seem 
disappointing initially, I actually think it’s a good thing. It would be rather 
surprising if careful thinking about the nature of scientific knowledge would 
suddenly entail that the limits of science are very different from what has been 
proposed on other grounds.
Where I nonetheless see my project making progress, is in proposing and 
exploring a different and promising approach to thinking about the limits of 
science. Rather than relying on more or less intuitive judgments about what 
science can and cannot do or what sorts of questions it can and cannot address, 
my approach is more systematic. Hopefully, thinking about the nature of 
scientific knowledge isn’t as divisive as thinking about the limits of science 
directly. If I’m right about this, my approach gives both proponents and 
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Notes:
(1.) One caveat about the project of this chapter. Popular discussions about the 
limits of science often mention knowledge of normative facts—moral knowledge 
in particular—and knowledge of supernatural facts as intrinsic limitations to 
scientific knowledge (Hughes 2012; Wieseltier 2013; cf. also Rescher 1999: 243– 
248; and René van Woudenberg’s contribution to this volume). While I have 
considerable sympathy for these ideas, I will leave them to one side here, 
because the existence of both robust normative facts and supernatural facts is 
controversial.
(2.) For the sake of brevity, I will not discuss those kinds of knowledge that wear 
their differences on their sleeves, such as non-inferential vs. inferential 
knowledge, individual vs. group knowledge, and extended vs. non-extended 
knowledge.
(3.) But perhaps all such wh-clauses are ultimately reducible to one or more 
propositional clauses, so that knowledge-wh is a subclass of propositional 
knowledge (cf. Parent 2014 for discussion).
(4.) Or perhaps having been able to employ your skills; someone who’s recently 
lost a hand might still know how to play the piano even if she cannot do so any 
longer.
(5.) Although recent work in enactivism and embodied cognition conceives of 
belief without any internal representations whatsoever (cf. Hutto and Myin 
2013).
(6.) Cf. Bertrand Russell’s characterization of it: “I say that I am acquainted with 
an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am 
directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do 
not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which 
constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which 
I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject 
which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is 
essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S” (Russell 1910: 108 
(although Russell didn’t think we have knowledge by acquaintance of persons); 
cf. Gertler 2012 for recent accounts).
(7.) But cf. Grimm (2016) who argues that the value of such reflective states is 
not epistemic but moral.
(8.) However, there are a few recent dissenters, who think a feasible 
demarcation criterion can be provided after all. See Ladyman et al. (2012) and 
several contributors to Pigliucci and Boudry (2013).
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(9.) Some notable exceptions are Alexander Bird’s work on the epistemology of 
science (Bird 2010b), John Hardwig’s (1985, 1991) papers on trust and epistemic 
dependence in science, Elizabeth Fricker’s (2002) paper on testimony in science, 
and Philip Kitcher’s (2002) epistemology-oriented overview of prominent debates 
in the philosophy of science. Even though these authors make insightful points 
about the goal of science, scientific progress, scientific inference, and the social 
character of scientific knowledge, none of them attempt to characterize what’s 
special about scientific knowledge when compared to nonscientific knowledge.
(10.) See Grimm (2001) and Greco (2014) for arguments to this effect.
(11.) There are different construals of the internalism/externalism distinction in 
epistemology. Here I am working with one default understanding of it in terms of 
whether or not knowledge requires cognitive access to the factors that confer 
the knowledge status on one’s belief (BonJour 2010).
(12.) To be clear: The proposal is to think of internalist standing as a necessary 
condition on scientific knowledge and not a sufficient one. There may be 
nonscientific knowledge with internalist standing too.
(13.) Elsewhere, I have argued that this feature makes much scientific 
knowledge collective knowledge (De Ridder 2014). Often, no single individual is 
cognitively able to bear the burden of having such internalistic epistemic 
standing.
(14.) I’m disregarding the possibility of radical changes in our cognitive make-up 
as a result of evolutionary or (bio)technological developments.
(15.) See Stroud (1989, 1994, 2004) and Sosa (2004: 315–317, 2009: 166–177, 
204–120) for discussion.
(16.) Perhaps some readers are tempted to take this argument as showing that 
high-grade knowledge of anything is impossible. Since (a) epistemic circularity 
besets all our basic belief-forming practices and (b) all our beliefs ultimately 
spring from one or more of these practices, it might seem that we lack the right 
sort of access to the quality of the grounds for all of our beliefs. I don’t think this 
follows, though. The thing to see is that there are other considerations bearing 
on the quality of the grounds for a belief, besides a non-circular argument for 
the reliability of the relevant belief-forming practice. If I see someone familiar 
approaching nearby, I can notice that my observation takes place in broad 
daylight, that I often see this person around here, that I’m not under the 
influence of any substances, etc. All these things tell me something about the 
quality of the grounds for my belief, even if I don’t have an unproblematic 
argument for the reliability of visual perception in general. Hence, the argument 
doesn’t automatically generalize into a skeptical one.
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(17.) See Leplin (1981) and Chakravartty (2007: Ch. 2) for discussion.
(18.) My impression is that most practicing scientists are keenly aware of this, 
which is why, when pressed, they are usually careful in making explicit 
knowledge claims. Most will talk of plausibility and probability when 
characterizing the confidence they have in the latest findings.
(19.) That is, as far as the researchers could tell at the time. It remains a 
(distant) possibility that some papers will be resuscitated at some point in the 
future. This is unlikely to happen to a great many papers, however, so the 
general conclusion stands.
(20.) Or, alternatively, between object perception and fact perception (Dretske 
1969).
(21.) I don’t mean to take a stand on whether experience is always and 
necessarily conceptually interpreted. If that’s the case, then the difference 
between the former and the latter case should be cashed out in terms of 
interpretation with more and less specific concepts.
(22.) In characterizing science as objectifying inquiry, Van Fraassen is laying out 
an ideal of science. He is not committed to the claim that actual science always 
fits this ideal perfectly.
(23.) Of course, when humans are the object of study, parameters will depend on 
us in the sense that they will describe qualities of human beings. But they must 
not do so in a way that depends on how these qualities look, feel, or seem to us.
(24.) Note that the metaphor of language is mine. Van Fraassen might not 
approve of it. It should certainly not be associated with the positivists’ ideal of 
an observational and theoretical language.
(25.) Van Fraassen is optimistic about how widely his notion of objectifying 
inquiry applies: “With some minor adjustments the pattern of objectifying 
inquiry is certainly general enough to include the sciences and in fact all 
disciplines pursued with academic discipline” (ibid.: 165, my italics). This strikes 
me as a bold claim. I do not find it easy to see how various forms of humanistic 
inquiry could fit the mold of objectifying inquiry. But it is sufficient for my 
purposes if objectifying inquiry at least captures what is special about scientific 
inquiry.
(26.) I’ll readily admit that what I say here is speculative and vague. I 
nonetheless hope that it conveys the thrust of how we could think about one 
kind of limit of science with the help of Van Fraassen’s picture of science.
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(27.) Although it would seem that scientific subdisciplines that are essentially 
concerned with things that affect human experience—such as nutrition science, 
pharmaceutical science, medicine, and many engineering disciplines—cannot 
avoid taking onboard such parameters.
(28.) If there indeed is distinctly second-personal knowledge (cf. Pinsent 2012; 
Stump 2010), that is, knowledge that is only available through interpersonal 
interactions with another person, then a parallel argument could be constructed 
that this constitutes a similar limit for scientific knowledge.
(29.) Thanks to Stephen Grimm, Rik Peels, Scott Robbins, and René van 
Woudenberg for very helpful comments on a previous version of this chapter. 
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